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LEGISLATION
Obscene Literature
In 1959 the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. California'
held a city and county ordinance unconstitutional for failure to
require scienter on the part of a defendant. That ordinance, like many
other ordinances and state statutes, subjected a bookseller to criminal
prosecution for the sale of obscene literature regardless of whether he
knew that it was obscene. The Court reasoned that such an ordinance
would result in a bookseller's refusal to sell many publications which
would not be legally suppressible but which the seller suspected of
being obscene, perhaps without having read them.2 This self-censor-
ship would constitute a restraint on freedom of speech and press in
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Smith decision poses two major questions for statutory drafts-
men. First, what degree of awareness on the part of a defendant is
required to satisfy the scienter requirement prescribed by Smith?
Must the bookseller have read the book and be consciously aware
that it is obscene as a matter of law, or is it enough that he has read
it and merely ought to be aware that its contents are obscene as a
matter of fact? Is it even necessary that a bookseller read the book, if
other circumstances indicate that he should know that the book may
be obscene? Second, what quantum and type of proof is required in
order to establish the presence of this necessary degree of awareness
on the part of a defendant? If it is necessary to prove by direct evi-
dence that a bookseller knew that he was selling legally obscene
material, convictions will be difficult, if not impossible to obtain.3 On
1. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
2. Id. at 153.
3. In order to prove guilty knowledge it is usually necessary only to show that the
defendant knew the nature of the act which he did, regardless of whether he knew it
was unlawful. Under this theory, to find guilty knowledge on the part of a bookseller
selling an obscene book, the bookseller must have read the book in order to be aware
of the nature of the book he was selling. Booksellers, however, seldom read books
which they offer for sale, making proof of this guilty knowledge in many cases
virtually impossible. Moreover, it should be pointed out that whatever degree of
awareness may be required or whatever methods may be prescribed for carrying
the burden of proof, a resort to circumstantial evidence will always be necessary to
establish the presence of the required state of mind, unless the defendant confesses
to his state of mind. For a discussion of other problems involved in finding scienter
in obscenity cases, see Wilson, Californids New Obscenity Statute: The Meaning of
"Obscene" and the Problem of Scienter, 36 So. CArIM. L. REV. 513, 542 (1963).
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the other hand, acceptance by the courts of a quantum of proof of
awareness less than a showing of actual knowledge of obscenity may
tend to influence booksellers to become censors, and this may create
constitutional restrictions on freedom of speech and press. There is
also the problem of whether the finding of the requisite degree of
awareness should always be a question of fact for the jury's determi-
nation, or whether certain presumptions of awareness should be used
based on the finding of particular basic facts and circumstances.
The Supreme Court, having recognized these problems, has left the
task of providing definite answers to the state courts and legislatures.
4
Two approaches to the scienter question appear in the existing state
obscenity statutes. California's recently adopted law exemplifies the
stricter degree-of-awareness, or scienter requirement. This statute
punishes a defendant who has "knowingly" committed the prohibited
act, and defines "knowingly" as with "knowledge that the matter
is obscene."6  Proving a subjective intent to sell a book which
the seller knows to be obscene before he sells it would be a
difficult task requiring a great deal of circumstantial evidence to
allow even a reasonable inference of such intent. The Ohio statute
as it has been interpreted sets up less strict degrees of awareness re-
quirement and is representative of the burden of proof imposed on
the prosecution by a majority of the states. This statute also uses the
word "knowingly," but the courts find this element satisfied when a
defendant has "knowledge of the contents" of the book which he sold.7
Under this definition it is not necessary to prove that the defendant
knew that the articles sold were legally obscene, but merely that he
had knowledge of the articles and their contents before he sold them.
Thus, two different degree-of-awareness requirements have evolved,
one requiring proof that the defendant was aware that the articles
were actually obscene and the other requiring proof that the defendant
had knowledge of the contents of the articles sold.
As to the second question concerning the quantum and type of proof
required to establish the presence of the necessary degree of aware-
ness, most states have no statutory provision prescribing an answer.
This would imply that the establishment of the existence of the
requisite awareness is a fact question to be answered on the basis of
4. 361 U.S. at 154.
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(2).
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(e).
7. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (1964). States which define scienter as factual
knowledge of the contents include: Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(4) (Supp.
1963); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 20 (1964); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. §
436.100(2) (1962); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.68.010 (1961); Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. § 944.21 (1958).
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all available circumstantial evidence.8 A few states have created
evidentiary presumptions to facilitate the establishment of the
required proof. The Florida statute,9 for example, makes it a crime
"knowingly" to sell any obscene literature, and prescribes two methods
of proving knowledge: by showing that the defendant had "actual
knowledge of the contents" or by showing the presence of "facts and
circumstances as would put a man of ordinary intelligence and caution
on inquiry as to such contents or character."'10 A defendant's knowl-
edge of the contents, under the first Florida alternative, must normally
be established by circumstantial evidence sufficient to allow the trier
of fact to draw a reasonable inference therefrom. Under the second
Florida alternative, however, the trier of fact may presume a defend-
ant's "knowledge of the contents" from the existence of certain facts
and circumstances. Utah's statute" provides that any person having
books in his possession for resale "shall have the duty to make a
reasonable investigation of the contents thereof and shall be presumed
to have knowledge of the contents thereof which such investigation
would disclose."12 This statutory presumption considerably lightens
the prosecutor's burden of proof; in fact it almost presumes a book-
seller's knowledge of the contents of any obscene book, since the
statute apparently assumes that a reasonable investigation would dis-
close whether or not a book is legally obscene. The relevant Oregon
statute 3 provides that,
In any prosecution for a violation of this section, it shall be relevant on
the issue of knowledge to prove advertising, publicity, promotion, method of
handling or labeling of the matter, including any statement on the cover
or back of any book or magazine,
14
The effect of this statute is to significantly decrease the amount of
circumstantial evidence necessary to establish the requisite awareness.
As previously stated, the doctrine of the Smith case raises a serious
question concerning the constitutionality of the methods of proof and
statutory presumptions which are available to prosecutors in carrying
their burdens of proof. In criminal law, scienter is normally considered
8. People v. Harris, 192 Cal. App. 2d 887, 13 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1961); State v.
Onorato, 199 A.2d 715 (Conn. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Cercone, 196 A.2d 439 (Conn.
Ct. App. 1963); People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 205 N.Y.S.2d 94, afg'd, 9
N.Y.2d 578, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1960); People v. Schenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 195
N.Y.S.2d 570, aff'd, 207 N.Y.S.2d 389, rev'd on other grounds, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 214
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1961).
9. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1964).
10. FLA. STAT. § 847.011(5) (1964).
11. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-39-5(3) (1963).
12. UTAH CODE A N. § 76-39-6 (1963).
13. ORE. REv. STAT. § 167.151(1) (1963).
14. ORE. REv. STAT. § 167.151(4) (1963).
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to be a person's awareness of the nature of his actions, whether or
not he is also aware that those actions are a violation of the law.
An individual is presumed to know the law and, if he commits an
act without knowing that it is unlawful, he will not be permitted to
rely on his ignorance of the law to excuse him from criminal liability. 15
The fairness of presuming knowledge of the law in obscenity cases,
however, is glaringly open to criticism. Since obscenity is not clearly
defined, even one fully aware of the law can never be sure whether
the sale of a particular book violates the law.'6 A clear definition of
obscenity is impossible to formulate, since the same actions or words
can be arranged to convey many different meanings, some suppres-
sible and others not. Thus, if the proof of awareness necessary to
support an obscenity conviction is simply that a defendant have
knowledge of the contents of a book which he sells, it is apparent
that a bookseller may be convicted because of his awareness of the
contents of a book even though he does not know that it is legally
obscene. Realizing this, a bookseller will refuse to sell a book which
he has read and thought to be suspicious, rather than subject himself
to a possible conviction resulting from a presumption that he knows
the law. Thus, if scienter is defined as awareness of the contents of
a book and not as knowledge that it is legally obscene, there will
be the same encouragement of self-censorship in doubtful cases which
Smith held unconstitutional. Moreover, this self-censorship is in-
creased by the use of the various statutory presumptions. If a book-
seller knows that under certain circumstances he can be presumed
to have knowledge of the contents as well as being presumed to know
that these contents are legally obscene, he will be inclined to exercise
further self-censorship. What we are then confronted with is actually
a double presumption. The first is the familiar doctrine that an in-
dividual is presumed to know the law and that his ignorance of it
will not excuse him from criminal responsibility if he commits the
prohibited act.17 Injustice arises in that under this presumption a
bookseller is supposed to recognize obscenity upon sight, when in fact,
except perhaps in the case of hard core pornography, no one knows
what is legally obscene until it is so declared. When one superimposes
on this the second type of presumption as have the states of
Florida, Utah and Oregon, a bookseller can be presumed to have
15. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
16. The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), set up
as the test for obscenity "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest." Id. at 489. Under such a test it is obvious that no one can be sure
whether particular material is obscene until some court litigates it.
17. Supra note 16.
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knowledge of the contents from the existence of other key facts, in
addition to being presumed to know that the contents are obscene. 18
Thus, when statutory presumptions are used to facilitate proof of
awareness of the contents of a book, the likelihood of self-censorship
and resulting violations of freedom of speech and press is com-
pounded.
Suppose that the prosecution is required to prove that a defendant
is aware that the contents of a book which he sells are legally obscene
before the traditional knowledge of the law presumption operates.
Although this literally abolishes any presumption that an individual
knows the law, it appears to be the only standard of awareness which
can prevent self-censorship. If a bookseller is unaware that a book is
legally obscene, under this burden of proof, he need have no fear of
prosecution if he sells the book, and no longer feels the necessity for
self-censorship. This creates an obvious problem for the states. How
can a prosecutor possibly prove actual awareness of legal obscenity
when no one knows what is obscene until it is so declared by a court?
The use of presumptions would only recreate the problem of self-
censorship. But many believe that the impossibility of precisely
defining obscenity should not preclude the state from exercising its
legitimate interest in suppressing material which clearly has no re-
deeming social importance. 19 The logic of the Smith decision, how-
ever, seems to point to the impossibility of such a conclusion.20 The
18. See notes 10-15 supra.
19. It is difficult to define clearly the state's interest in obscenity regulation. It
is usually based on the premise that the government should prevent free dissemination
of obscene material, the only purpose of which is to appeal to the sexually immature.
The theory is that such material corrupts the minds of the sexually immature resulting
in an evil which the government must prevent. Many believe that this situation does
not justify regulation. It is doubtful, even if all obscene literature could be controlled,
that there would ever cease to be corrupted minds. Justices Black and Douglas in their
dissent in Roth v. United States, supra note 16, argued against any censorship unless
"the particular publication has an impact on actions that the government can control."
Id. at 511. Nevertheless, a majority of voters in many areas believe that obscene
literature should not be permitted free dissemination.
20. One of the arguments made in Roth was that obscenity statutes do not provide
"reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt and therefore violate the constitutional
requirements of due process." 354 U.S. at 491. In Roth the Supreme Court refused
to accept this argument citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). "That
there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the
line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the
language too ambigious to define a criminal offense. ... Id. at 7. It appears, iow-
ever, that the thrust of the reasoning behind the Smith case should cast some
doubt on the status of these statements as current law. Even though the reasoning
of the Smith decision, when brought to its logical conclusion, leads to this result,
it should be pointed out that Smith also contains dicta indicating that the state's
right to regulate is not defeated by the fact that, due to vagueness, a certain degree of
self-censorship is bound to result. But the degree of self-censorship induced by the
particular type city ordinance in Los Angeles was clearly not within the permissible
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 18
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ultimate solution to the problem must lie in obtaining a prior adjudica-
tion of obscenity by utilizing a declaratory judgment proceeding.
Where a particular book is adjudicated obscene and notice of the
proceeding is given to booksellers, a presumption of legal obscenity
in a subsequent prosecution for the sale of the same book would not
be unreasonable nor would its effect be unconstitutional. Only that
which actually is adjudicated legally obscene would be suppressed,
and booksellers would feel free to sell any other material no matter
how suspicious it may be.
21
Only in cases of hard core pornography does there seem to be any
justification for eliminating the requirement of a prior adjudication of
obscenity. Presumably hard core pornography includes that material
so vile that any person recognizes it to be obscene upon sight. But
even this definition of hard core pornography does not preclude
differences of opinion in specific cases. If hard core pornography is
made an exception to the prior adjudication requirement, it would be
all too easy for prosecutors to avoid prior adjudication in a specific case
by merely stating that the material involved is hard core pornography.
The only conceivable solution is to leave the determination in all
cases to a court composed of men competent to make such a decision.
PROPOSED STATUTE
(1) Whoever knowingly imports, prints, advertises, sells, has in his
possession for sale, or publishes, exhibits, or transfers commercially any
lewd, obcene or indecent written materials shall be fined not more
than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
(2) Proof that a defendant "knowingly" committed any act referred
to in section (1) may only be made by showing that the particular
material involved had been adjudicated obscene in a prior proceeding
and notice of this proceeding had been given in accordance with
sections (3) and (4).
(3) Whenever there is reasonable grounds to believe that any ma-
terial which is being used in the manner stated in section (1) is lewd,
obscene or indecent, the public prosecutor may file a compaint in the
proper court, directed against such material by name. Upon filing of
the complaint the court shall make d. summary examination of such
bounds. This inconsistency of the Smith decision is characteristic of any argument which
attempts to support limited censorship on one hand and free speech on the other. Smith
seems to say that the states cannot enact a statute which creates self-censorship since
this is a restriction on constitutional free speech and press. But at the same time they
say that the states can continue to practice censorship as long as they do not induce
too much self-censorship. Then the only guideline left for the states is that the degree
of self-censorship induced in Smith was not permissible.
21. For examples of obscenity statutes authorizing declaratory judgment proceedings,
see FLA. STAT. § 847.011(7) (Supp. 1964); MASS. GEr. LAws ch. 272, § 280 (Supp.
1964); Wis. STAT. § 269.565 (Supp. 1965).
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material. If it is the opinion of the court that there is reasonable cause
to believe that such material is obscene, it shall issue an order, directed
against said material by name, to show cause why said material should
not be judicially determined to be obscene. This order shall be ad-
dressed to all persons interested in the material including the publisher,
producer, and one or more distributors of said material and shall be
returnable within 30 days. This order shall also be published in a
newspaper of general circulation for five successive days. Thirty days
after issuance of this order, the court shall proceed to adjudicate the
issue of whether the particular material is lewd, obscene or indecent.
(4) The name of such material as is adjudicated lewd, obscene or
indecent in accordance with section (3) shall be placed on a list and
a copy of said list shall be published every three months in a news-
paper of general circulation for five successive days.22
Protection of the Surviving Spouse's Rights
Under Elective Share Statutes
Statutes protecting a surviving spouse's rights in her husband's
property, and imposing restraints on voluntary disinheritance by the
husband, are as old as the Code of Hammurabi. 1 At common law,
a widow was protected against complete disinheritance by the right
of dower, which consisted of a life estate in one-third of the lands
and tenements of which her husband was seised at any time during
coverture and which could have descended to the issue of the mar-
riage.2 A widow's right to such an estate arose by operation of law,
independent of any rights that she might have acquired by testa-
mentary provision.3 During the marriage, a wife had a protected
expectancy in this estate called "inchoate dower" which could be
defeated only in certain defined and limited ways.4 Thus, at a time
when wealth was concentrated largely in real property, inchoate
dower effectively prevented a husband from decimating his estate
22. Ibid.
1. HARPER, CODE OF HAmMOTRABI §§ 168-72 (1904); Ureh, The Law Code of
Hammurabi, 15 A.B.A.J. 437 (1929). See Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85
U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936).
2. 1 AmicA. LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.1, at 616 (Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as LAW OF PROPERTY]; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAu'ny LAWs § 188, at 345 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as VERNiER].
3. Supra note 2.
4. 1 LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.31; 1 WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 101 (1947).
§ 101 (1947).
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through gifts and other inter vivos transactions and thereby disin-
heriting his wife.
Early in the nineteenth century, however, state legislatures began
to recognize two important facts about common law dower: (1) that
because of the change in our economy from an agricultural to an
industrial era, with wealth concentrated in personalty, dower has
ceased to provide significant protection against disinheritance of
married women, and (2) that inchoate dower causes burdensome
restraints on free alienation of real property.5 Consequently, most
states today have abolished dower altogether.6 Even in states which
have retained it, this right has been greatly modified; some states
have raised the wife's interest to one-half;7 some have increased her
estate from a life estate to one in fee;8 and some have limited
dower rights to property of which the husband dies seised.9 In addi-
tion to statutory abolishment or modification of dower, most states
have enacted elective share (sometimes called "forced share") stat-
utes, which typically allow a widow to take a stated fraction of the
personal property in her husband's probate estate in lieu of her
testamentary provision.'0 A widow's statutory elective share in her
husband's estate is usually the same as, though not to be confused
with, the share provided for her under statutes dealing with intestate
succession." Since elective share statutes have been passed almost
exclusively in states which have either abolished or sharply restricted
dower rights, it is apparent that they were enacted for the principal
purpose of protecting married women against total disinheritance,
which, protection was formerly provided by common law dower.' 2
5. See generally 1 LAW OF PnorE~nr § 5.5, at 631; 3 V mrman, § 189, 351-54
(1935); 1 WA.sH, op. cit. supra note 4, 110.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. See, e.g., AIA. CODE tit. 34,§ 41 (1959); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 392.020 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 396.020 (1963).
9. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1952); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560.3
(1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-601 (1955).
10. For typical statutes abolishing dower and substituting an elective share for the
surviving spouse, see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-211, 6-301 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 111, §§ 1051, 1056 (1964); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.15-.16 (1947), § 519.09
(Supp. 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 453, 668 (1942); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
9(4), tit. 84, § 44 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6, tit. 20, § 1.5 (1950);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-37, -47 (1957).
For statutes retaining dower and, in addition, giving the surviving spouse the right
to an elective share, see ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 41, tit. 61, § 18 (1959); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-101, -108 (1952); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1955); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-605 (1955). See also 1 LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.42, at 735; 3 VmmN ,
§ 189, at 354-55 (1935); Cahn, supra note 1, at 141.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 18 (1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-605 (1955).
See also SAnvs, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 32(a) (1946).
12. Spies, Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157, 178 (1960). See
note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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State legislatures have been criticized for their failure to abolish
inchoate dower completely and effectively,13 and one writer has
remarked that "no field is more deserving of complete renovation."14
The constant pressure to make land more freely alienable by abolish-
ing dower has indeed had its effect, 15 but this emphasis upon free
alienability has pushed aside much concern with the central purpose
of elective share statutes-protecting the married woman from com-
plete disinheritance by her husband. Present day elective share
statutes typically provide the married woman with but a small part
of the protection for her expectancy which she enjoyed under inchoate
dower at common law.16 Most statutes merely guarantee that a mar-
ried woman shall be entitled to a stated fractional share of her
husband's probate estate.'7 Hence, a husband may quite often defeat
his wife's statutory share in his personal property, and, if dower has
been abolished, in his real property as well, by transferring his
property in such a way as to assure that it will not be brought within
his probate estate. He may of course accomplish this while retaining
for himself beneficial enjoyment in such property during his lifetime.
Some of the more common devices used by wealthy husbands to deci-
mate their estates are revocable trusts; 8 trusts with life estate
reserved; life insurance, with power reserved to change the bene-
ficiary; 9 life insurance trusts; 20 jointly owned property and bank
accounts;2' and outright gifts made by the husband in contempla-
tion of death.
The need to formulate an elective share statute that will protect
the wife from substantial disinheritance while not unreasonably fet-
tering alienability of her husband's property during coverture has
been met effectively by very few legislatures. 22 The burden of pro-
tecting the wife's expectancy in her husband's property has fallen
largely on the judiciary. In construing elective share statutes, courts
have generally started with the proposition that inter vivos transfers
13. See, e.g., 1 LAW oF P OPERTY § 5.5, at 633; 3 VERmNm, § 188, at 346-47 (1935);
Comment, 8 ALA. L. REv. 317 (1956); Spies, supra note 12 at 159.
14. 3 VERmNER, § 188, at 347.
15. The great majority of states today have either abolished or sharply restricted
dower. See note 10 supra and the statutes cited therein.
16. Cahn, supra note 1; Spies, supra note 12.
17. See note 10 supra and the statutes cited therein.
18. Goldman, Rights of the Spouse and the Creditor in Inter Vivos Trusts, 17
U. Cnic. L. REv. 1 (1948).
19. Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L.J.
343 (1922).
20. Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 256 (1956).
21. Effland, Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 507; Comment,
1957 U. L. L.F. 655.
22. See note 13 supra.
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defeating a wife's elective share in her husband's property are not
necessarily in violation of the elective share statute.23 One court-made
exception to this rule is that any transfer made with the intent of
defeating a spouse's statutory share is invalid.24 This view, called the
"intent" or "fraud" test, has been incorporated into some elective
share statutes.25 The New York Court of Appeals, in Newman v.
Dore,26 rejected the "intent" test as too uncertain and formulated what
has since been deemed the majority rule-that only those transfers
by the husband which the court deems to be "illusory" or "testamen-
tary" will be subject to the surviving spouse's elective share. To
implement this rule, the New York court set out what has been called
the "contror" test. Under this test, when the husband reserves sub-
stantial power over the property transferred, the transfer is deemed
"illusory" and subject to the surviving spouse's elective share.27 This
test has been used successfully in some states to protect a widow's
interest in revocable trusts set up by the husband for the benefit of
third parties, but courts have generally refused to extend the pro-
tection provided by the "contror' test to other types of inter vivos
transfers.2
The Model Probate Code, while calling for outright abandonment
of dower,29 gives the surviving spouse an elective share in her hus-
band's estate, including real and personal property, equal to the
amount that would pass to her under the section dealing with intestate
succession.30 The Code proposes to protect this interest, or ex-
pectancy, by applying a variation of the "intent" test, which would
allow the surviving spouse to recover her share out of "any gifts
made. .. in fraud of her marital rights" 3' such fraud being presumed
when gifts are made by the deceased spouse within two years prior to
his death.32 A fourth method for protecting the elective share rights
of a surviving spouse recently proposed is to impose a "statutory
trust" of one-third of all real and personal property owned by each
23. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Sheppard, 198 Ga. 254, 31 S.E.2d 457 (1944); Holmes
v. Mimes, 1 Ill. 2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 290 (1953); In re Golewitz" Estate, 206 Misc.
218, 132 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1954); Richards v. Richards, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 429
(1850).
24. Probably the leading case for this view is Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust
Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 150 S.W.2d 611 (1939).
25. See TENr. CODE ANN. § 31-612 (1955). See also SiES, op. cit. supra note
11, § 33(a).
26. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
27. Ibid.
28. Smith, The Present Status of Illusory Trusts-The Doctrine of Newman v. Dore
Brought Down to Date, 44 MicH. L. REv. 151 (1955).
29. Sams, op. cit. supra note 11, § 32.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. § 33(a).
32. Id. § 33(b).
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spouse in favor of the other spouse.33 Under this proposal a wife would
have a non-assignable, equitable interest in one-third of her husband's
property, subject to divestment in case of divorce or failure to survive
her husband. Conveyance of property by the husband to a bona fide
purchaser for value would cut off this interest, but it would attach
automatically to the consideration received by the husband. If,
however, the transfer were not for value, the transferee would take
subject to the surviving spouse's equitable interest.3
It is submitted that the first aim of an effective, workable elective
share statute should be to abolish completely common law dower and
curtesy, and in their stead to create in the surviving spouse a frac-
tional, fee simple elective share in all the real and personal property
owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his death. Experience
has demonstrated that anything less than complete abrogation of
dower leads to confusion and uncertainty in conveyancing. 35 It
should be noted that the proposed fractional share differs from
common law dower in several ways: it extends to personalty as well
as to realty; it is operative as to the husband as well as to the wile;
it is a free interest rather than a life estate; it is elective, that is, taken
in lieu of any testamentary disposition; it attaches only to property
in which the deceased spouse had an interest at the time of his death.
As to these points, the proposals closely follow the Model Probate
Code.3
This discussion is focused, however, on protection of the surviving
spouse's statutory share, and on this point it is submitted that the
Model Code's provision-that gifts "in fraud of ...marital rights" 7
are subject to the elective share-would not provide adequate protec-
tion. Although this provision could be made effective by broad
judicial construction, it suffers from the same defect as the "intent"
test8 in that it is based on the state of mind of the deceased spouse
at the time the transfer was made, and consequently, its application
would be uncertain as well as easy to avoid. The "control" test 39
formulated by the New York court, though more objective than the"intent" test, is equally uncertain in that neither the degree nor
kind of reserved control necessary to invalidate the deceased spouse's
inter vivos transfers is specified. Finally, it is submitted that the
"statutory trust" proposal" would inhibit the free alienability of
33. Spies, supra note 12, at 183.
34. Ibid.
35. See note 13 supra.
36. See note 29 supra.
37. Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., supra note 24.
38. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 27 s-upra and accompanying text.
40. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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property in the same manner as did inchoate dower, a result most
elective share statutes were designed to eliminate. Under such a
proposal, not only would the power of married persons to make abso-
lute gifts of property, real or personal, be curtailed, but any trans-
action made by a spouse would later be subject to possible invalida-
tion on the ground that inadequate consideration was received. To
avoid the uncertainties inherent in the "intent" and "control" tests
as they formerly have been applied, while not placing undue restric-
tions on the free alienation of married persons' property, it is sub-
mitted that a model elective share statute should subject only certain,
specifically-named types of inter vivos transfers made by the deceased
spouse to the surviving spouse's fractional share. For this purpose,
it is further submitted that the federal estate tax sections in the
Internal Revenue Code which define the extent of property in a
decedent's gross estate41 should be used as guidelines for defining
the types of transfers which would be brought within the decedent's
probate estate for purposes of determining the surviving spouse's
elective share.42 Thus, the husband would be able to make absolute,
unconditional gifts free from his wife's expectancy under statute with
the exception of gifts made in contemplation of death.43 If, however,
he should retain any interest or beneficial enjoyment that would
bring the transferred property within his gross estate for estate tax
purposes,4 such property would be subject to the widow's statutory
elective share. The main effect of such a provision would be to
prevent the inequitable situation in which the husband, by means of
the inter vivos transactions mentioned earlier,45 retains a substantial
interest in the transferred property until his death, being assured all
the while that such property will not pass through his probate estate,
and thus will be insulated from his wife's statutory elective share.
To avoid this loophole in elective share statutes, the writer submits
that, having abolished dower and curtesy, and having established an
elective share of the probate estate similar to that provided in the
Model Probate CodeA state legislatures should redefine probate
estate, solely for the purposes of determining the surviving spouse's
elective share, by incorporating the following provision into elective
share statutes:
41. Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031-44.
42. This idea has been briefly mentioned in Atkinson, Catching Up With Changing
Influences On the Inheritance Process, 93 ThusTs & EsTAT.s 244 (1954); Goldman,
supra note 18.
43. See Irr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
44. E.g., transfers with retained life estate, id., § 2036; transfers taking effect at death,
id., § 2037; revocable transfers, id., § 2038; joint interests, id., § 2040.
45. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.




In determining the fractional share which a surviving spouse may
elect to take under this statue, the term "probate estate" shall include
all property in the deceased spouse's "gross estate," as defined in the
Estate Tax section of the United States Internal Revenue Code of
1954. In the event that the preceding provision increases the surviving
spouse's elective share, the amount by which such increased share
exceeds the fractional share of the ordinary probate estate, without
the preceding provision, shall be applied only to the property brought
into the probate estate solely by virtue of the preceding provision.47
All such property shall be declared by the probate court as held in
trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse, to the extent of the frac-
tional share, and a decree ord6ring division and tarnsfer of such prop-
erty shall be given, at the election of the surviving spouse.
The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of
Juveniles Accused of "Crime"
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have brought an increasing percentage of our popula-
tion into the juvenile age category.1 Yet, the number of crimes com-
mitted by juveniles has increased almost three times as fast as the
47. This sentence would prevent a wife from taking all of the property in her
husband's ordinary probate estate by virtue of the enlargement of the estate in the
preceding sentence. If a wife is to take advantage of this enlargement of the estate,
and thus the enlargement of her fractional share, the larger share must come only
out of all the property brought into the probate estate by the preceding sentence.
1. For the purposes of this article the juvenile age category includes persons of the
ages ten to eighteen years. This is based upon a survey of the Juvenile Court Acts of
the several states and the District of Columbia which provide as follows:
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1959) (16); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1962) (18);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956) (18); Amx. STAT. ANN. § 45-204 (1964) (18);
CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 504; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-1 (1953)
(18 or 16 plus capital offense); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-53 (Supp. 1963) (16);
DEL. CODE ANN. § 1101 (1955) (18 unless felony); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1551
(Supp. IV, 1965) (18); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1961) (17); GA. CODE ANN. §
24-2408 (1959) (17); HAwAII REV. LAWs § 333-1 (1955) (over 12 and under 18);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1802 (Supp. 1963) (18); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2001 (Smith-
Hurd 1964) (female under 18 and male under 17); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3203 (1956)
(18); IowA CODE § 232.1 (1949) (18 unless capital offense); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-802 (Supp. 1959) (female under 18 and male under 16); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.010 (1962) (21); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.1569 (Supp. 1963) (17); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. eh. 152-A, § 2 (Supp. 1963) (17); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52
(1957) (18); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (Supp. 1964) (over 7 and under
17); Micir. STAT. Ar. § 27.3178 (1962) (19); MWNN. STAT. § 260.111 (Supp. 1964)
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juvenile population.2 While the rights of adults accused of crime
have been receiving renewed attention and the public eye has been
directed to the problem of bail and pre-trial detention of adults,
3
surprisingly little consideration has been given to the same problem
with respect to juveniles. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
bail and pre-trial detention problems facing the juvenile accused of
"criminal"4 conduct.
(18 subject to permissible reference if over 14); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-02 (1952)
(over 10 and under 18); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1959) (17); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 10-603 (1947) (21); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201 (Supp. 1963) (18); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62.020 (1957) (18); N.H. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 169.1 (1964) (18); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4-14 (1952) (18); N.M. STAT. ANNr. § 13-8-20 (Supp. 1963) (18); N.Y.
JuDIcn&RY-FAmLY CoURT AcT § 712 (over 7 and under 16); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-21 (1960) (16); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-1-07 (1960) (18); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Baldwin 1964) (18); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 772
(1962) (18); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.476 (1953) (18); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 243 (1939) (18); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3 (1956) (18); S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-1171 (1962) (17); S.D. CODE § 43.0301 (1939) (18); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-242
(Supp. 1964) (18); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1964) (female over
10 and under 18 and male over 10 and under 17); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-6 (1963)
(18); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 602 (1959) (16); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1960)
(18); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010 (1962) (18); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
4904 (1961) (18); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (1957) (18); WYo. STAT. ANN. §
14-98 (1957) (18).
2. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICAL SERIES No. 73 (1963).
3. See, e.g., WALD & FEEr, BAUL nN = UNrrID STATES: 1964 (1964), and the
projects enumerated therein.
4. "Criminal" is used here to indicate conduct which if exhibited by an adult would
be the basis for criminal prosecution. However, most of the juvenile court acts provide
that such conduct on the part of the juvenile shall not constitute a crime:
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 378 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1962); Asuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-228 (1956); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 45-205 (1964); CAL. WELFARE &
INST'NS CODE § 503; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-843 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§ 17-53 (Supp. 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1176 (1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.10 (1961);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2418 (1959); HAwAii REv. LAWS § 333-1 (1055); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 16-1814 (Supp. 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2001 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-3222 (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-801 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 208.200 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1580 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 152-A, § 2 (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 54 (Supp. 1964); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 53 (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (1962); MINN. STAT. §
260.211 (Supp. 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-08 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.271
(1959); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-601 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-206.03
(Supp. 1963); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.200 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.26
(1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-39 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-65 (Supp. 1963);
N.Y. JuDIcImRY-FAmmY CoURT AcT. § 781; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-24 (1960);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-21 (1960); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Bald-
win 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 822 (1962); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.543
(1953; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 262 (1939); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-40
(1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1202 (1962); S.D. CODE § 43.0327 (1939); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-267 (Supp. 1964); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §
13 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-33 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 671
(1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.240
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.38 (1957);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-109 (1957).
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II. THE JuvENILE's BIGHT TO BAIn PBIOR TO
THE JUVENLE COURT ACTs
The United States Constitution does not expressly grant a right to
bail; the Eighth Amendment provides merely that excessive bail shall
not be required.5 However, from the adoption of the Judiciary Act
of 17896 through the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
7
the federal courts have held that in all but capital cases8 a person
accused of a crime has an absolute right to be admitted to bail.9
Substantially the same right is guaranteed by the constitutions or
statutes of all but seven states.10
Until the passage of the juvenile court laws the same right pre-
sumably extended to a juvenile accused of a crime; for until the
special jurisdiction of the juvenile court was established, the juvenile
was legally responsible-subject to certain presumptions based on his
age-for his criminal conduct and could be subjected to the same
punishments inflicted upon adults convicted of the same offense.'
Certainly, under those circumstances the juvenile was to be afforded
the same procedural safeguards as the adult.
III. THE JUVENILE'S BIGHT TO BAIL UNDER THE
JuvENILE CouRT Acts
The various juvenile court acts passed in most of the fifty states
12
have given exclusive original jurisdiction 3 over the juvenile 4 accused
5. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
6. 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789).
7. ED. R. Cm. P. 46.
8. In capital cases the right to bail has been held to be discretionary.
9. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
10. WALrD & FR=zp, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2 n.8.
11. For an excellant summary of the common law and the present law in England
on this point, see RussErL, Cnmm 98-101 (12th ed. 1964).
12. All of the fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutory provisions
placing jurisdiction over juveniles accused of crime in one specialized court or in a
special term of the county or district court. However, not all states have provisions
as comprehensive as those suggested by the National Probation Association, National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges, and the U.S. Children's Bureau. See STANDARD
JuvENiLE CoURT AcT.
13. However, most of the acts provide that if a juvenile is over a certain age
(usually 16) and has committed an offense of a certain degree of seriousness (usually
that which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony) the juvenile court judge
may in his discretion transfer the juvenile to the county court for prosecution as an
adult. See, e.g., STANDARD JuvENLE CoURT ACT § 13. Cases involving violations of
state and local motor vehicle laws are another common exception to the juvenile
court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Most juvenile court acts provide that in this
latter class of case the juvenile may be prosecuted in the city or county courts in the
same manner as an adult.
14. See note 1 supra.
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of violating the law' 5 to the juvenile court.16 These acts have treated
the subject of bail with everything from affirmative approval through
complete neglect to express disapproval. Nine states have expressly
provided that the rules as to bail in criminal actions shall apply to
juvenile court proceedings.'7 Three states have provisions which
seem to imply that there is a right to bail.' 8 On the other hand, three
states have expressly provided that the rules as to bail in criminal
actions shall not apply,19 while eight others reach the same result by
innuendo.20 The remaining twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have no provisions expressly dealing with the question.
21
15. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
16. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 351 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1962); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 (1956); Apx. STAT. ANN. § 45-206 (1964); CAL. WE.rX E &
INST'NS CODE § 5; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-7 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 17-53 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1151 (Supp. 1962); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
1551 (Supp. IV, 1965); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. §
24-2408 (1959); HAwAn REV. LAws § 333-2 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1803
(Supp. 1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch., 23, § 2002 (Smith-Hurd 1958); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3103 (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-806 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 208-020 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1563 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 152-A, § 3 (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 53 (Supp. 1964); MASS. G_.N.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, §§ 61, 74 (Supp. 1964); Micia. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (1962);
MiNN. STAT. § 260.111 (Supp. 1964); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7185-03 (1952); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-603 (1947); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 43-202 (Supp. 1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.040 (1957); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 169.29 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-8-26 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. JurDicrAy-FAmY COURT ACT § 713; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 110-21 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08 (1960); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.23 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 773 (1962);
OnE. REv. STAT. § 419.476 (1953).; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (Supp. 1964);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-5 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (1962);
S.D. CODE § 43.0302 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-243 (Supp. 1964); TEx. REv.
Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 5 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-3 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 601 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1960); WASn. REv.
CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904 (1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.12 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-100 (1957). Contra, State v. Reed, 207
Iowa 557, 218 N.W. 609 (1928); IowA CODE § 232.1 (1964).
17. AL . CODE tit. 13, § 368 (1959); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 45-227 (1964); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-6 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2415 (1935); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 67 (1957); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (1962); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 110-27 (1960); S.D. CODE § 43.0309 (1939); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904
(1961).
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2022 (Smith-Hurd 1958); IowA CODE § 232.17
(1949); WAsE. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.115 (1962).
19. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.110 (1962); N.Y. JuniciaY LAW § 724; ORE. REv.
STAT. § 419.583 (1953).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-63 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 152-A, §
14 (Supp. 1963); MiNN. STAT. § 260.171 (1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-06 (1952)
(See also Annot., 160 A.L.R. 287); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 169.21(a) (1964);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1185 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-251 (Supp. 1964); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.197 (1960).
21. Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
2_100
In those jurisdictions where no statutory provision expressly grants or
denies a right to bail,22 there are few cases dealing with the issue2
and those which have been decided are in conflict. The courts which
have held that the juvenile court acts abrogate the right to bail as it
existed under the common law,24 have done so on two grounds. First,
since the proceedings are denominated civil rather than criminal and
the disposition is intended as a treatment rather than punishment,
the common law rule applicable to criminal proceedings no longer
applies, and in civil proceedings the question of bail is wholly within
the discretion of the trail judge. Second, an absolute right to bail is
inconsistent with the purpose of the juvenile court acts, which is to
provide care and guidance for those juveniles in need both before and
after their hearings. The cases adopting the opposite view 25 rely on
two major arguments. First, the purpose of the juvenile court acts is
to provide additional benefits for the juvenile and not to remove those
rights which he had previously possessed. Second, while the aim of
juvenile court detention is, theoretically, to provide care and treat-
ment, in practice this is not the case and cannot be used to justify the
intrusion upon the rights of the juvenile and his family.
IV. THE PROBLEM ON T=E TioRE icAL LEVEL
AND ITS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
On purely theoretical grounds, there should clearly be no absolute
right to bail in juvenile court proceedings.26 An absolute right to
bail is inconsistent with the basic policy of the juvenile court acts
Wisconsin, Wyoming. The District of Columbia is also silent on this point.
22. See note 21 supra.
23. There are several factors responsible for the lack of cases litigating this point.
The most important are the limited right of appeal and the limited access to counsel
in the juvenile courts. While the statutory provisions in most states would seem to
contradict this observation, in practice those provisions have not received their due.
Furthermore, since the individuals who more commonly find themselves confronted
with an unjust detention are usually of meager financial means, a contest on this
point is usually out of the question.
24. In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); A. N. E. v. State,
156 So. 2d 525 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963); State v. Fullmer, 76 Ohio App. 335, 62
N.E.2d 268 (1945); Ex parte Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 158 S.W.2d 576 (1945).
25. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 202 La.
439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943).
26. This is the position taken by the Standard Juvenile Court Act. STANDAnD
JuvNiLE CouRT AcT § 17(6). See also Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Of-
fender, 41 Mn, . L. REv. 547, 552 (1957). The present article vill proceed on
the basic assumption that the idea of a juvenile court is a good one and can be
implemented to further the basic policy of the juvenile court acts. However, passing
reference should be made to the developments in England, Scotland and Wales.
In those countries, this basic assumption is a major issue; a recent study in Scotland
has recommended that the idea of juvenile court be abandoned. 1964 BurT. J. Cnum.
L. 604. While some of the comments which follow may be said to raise problems
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which provide a juvenile coming within their purview the care,
guidance, and control most conducive to his welfare and the best
interests of the state.27  Certainly, there are many cases in which
release would not be in the best interests of the state and may even
be potentially detrimental to the welfare of the child.28 However,
underlying this argument and the policy of the juvenile court acts is
the assumption that it will be in the better interests of the juvenile to
detain him. Whether this assumption is valid depends in turn upon
the adequacy of the detention facilities available and the efficacy of
their use and operation.
The juvenile court acts contemplate that the judge making the
determination as to whether the juvenile should be detained or
released would have a choice between releasing the child or providing
him with care which would closely approximate that which he should
receive at home.29 Most of the acts contain elaborate provisions for
the establishment of specialized detention centers. 30 Usually provision
is made for alternative procedures when specialized centers are not
available.3' In addition, protective provisions are common; these
include prohibitions against the use of jails, lockups or prisons,3
which undermine this basic assumption, it is submitted that those problems may be
solved within the framework of the juvenile court system.
27. STANDARD JUVENILE COURT AcT § 1. Most of the states have adopted pro-
visions which are substantially the same as § 1 of the standard act.
28. Paulsen, in his article makes the point with this example: "See, for example,
In re Tillotson, 255 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954), which tells of a young girl who had
sexual relations with a man in 'her mother's bed at her home in New Orleans, with
her mother's apparent consent and approval,' and Application of Jones, 206 Misc. 557,
134 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1954), which tells of a fifteen year old who had been abused by
her stepfather." Paulsen, supra note 26, at 552 n.21.
29. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.170-.10.260 (1957); CAL. WELFARE &
INST'NS CODE §§ 850-70; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2161-77 (Smith-Hurd 1964);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-707, 38-523 to -27 (Supp. 1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
211.151, 211.331, 211.341 (1959); N.Y. CoUNTY LAW § 218-a; Ormo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.34-3415 (Baldwin 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-49 to -49.6 (1963); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-198 to -202.9 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.135 (1962).
31. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-12-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 416.02
(1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3222 (1956); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 68
(1057); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-06 (1952); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-206.02 (Supp.
1963); O.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 812 (1962). Such alternative procedures
include the use of foster homes, private institutions and placement agencies. In some
cases the court is authorized to place the child in the custody of a respectable citizen.
32. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 379 (1959) (unless absolutely necessary and no other
arrangements can be made); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.130 (1959) (unless over 18 or
separated from adults); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-225 (1964) (unless female over
18 or male over 17 or detention home not available); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE
§ 507 (unless over 18 or no other adequate facilities available); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 22-8-6 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-63 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. §
1174 (1955); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313 (Supp. IV, 1964) (unless he is a menace
to other children); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03 (1961) (unless the judge determines that
it is necessary); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2416 (1935) (unless judge orders or detention
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periodic inspection of facilities designated for detention use,3 and
maximum time limits on the length of detention prior to the formal
filing of a petition.3
It is also intended that the judge making the determination will
home not available); HAwArr REv. LAws § 333-13 (1955) (unless over 19 or accused
of a felony); ILL. ANN. STAT. cb. 23, § 2022 (Smith-Hurd 1958); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-3222 (1956) (unless over 18); IowA CODE § 232.17 (1949) KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-823 (Supp. 1959) (unless by order of court and charge of delinquency); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.120 (1962) (unless over 16 or by order of court); LA. R-v.
STAT. ANN. § 13.1577 (1951) (unless over 15 and separated from adults); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 152-A, § 14 (Supp. 1963) (unless by court order and in the best
interests of the community or juvenile); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 58 (Supp. 1963)
(unless separated from adults); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §§ 66-67 (Supp.
1964) (unless over 17 or over 14 and no detention facilities are available); Micii.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.16) (Supp. 1964) (unless 15 and a menace to other
children in detention facilities); MnrN. STAT. § 260.175 (Supp. 1964) (unless other
facilities are not available or his habits constitute a menace to other children in
detention facilities); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-06 (1952) (unless a menace to other
children in detention facilities); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.151 (1959) (unless a menace
to other children in detention facilities); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-626 (1947)
(unless over 18, or over 16 and accused of felony, or a menace to other children in
detention facilities); NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.170 (1957) (unless over 18 or no other
facilities available); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.7 (1964) (unless a menace to
other children in detention facilities); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-33 (1952) (unless
over 18 or over 16 and no other place is available); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-44
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-30 (1960); Orr.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 811 (1962)
(unless 16 and accused of a felony); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.575 (1953) (unless 16
and a menace to other children in detention facilities or 14 and no other facilities
are available); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 249 (Supp. 1964) (unless over 16); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-23 (1956); S.D. CODE § 43.0309 (Supp. 1960) (unless over
15); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANr. art. 2338-1, § 17 (1964) (unless female over 18
or male over 17); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 620 (1959) (unless over 16 or charged
with crime punishable by death); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-196 (1960) (unless over 18
or over 14 with consent of the court); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.115 (1962)
(unless over 16); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904 (1961) (unless over 16); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.30 *(1957) (unless a menace to other children in detention facilities);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-102 (1957) (unless over 13).
33. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.240 (1957); CAL. WELFAnE & INST'NS CODE §
509; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 416.08 (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2029 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-18,19 (1964). Along the same lines, many
states require that private agencies who handle the detention of juveniles be licensed.
See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-506 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-12-2,
22-12-3, 22-12-4 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 98 17-48 to 17-50 (Supp. 1963);
IowA CODE § 232.37 (1946).
34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140 (1962) (48 hours); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.03 (1961) (48 hours); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2416 (1935) (24 hours); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 1811 (Supp. 1963) (24 hours); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.110 (1963)
(24 hours); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1577 (1951) (24 hours); MINN. STAT. §
260.171 (Supp. 1964) (48 hours); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-205 (Supp. 1963) (48
hours); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-43 (Supp. 1963) (48 hours); N.Y. JUDIcURY LAW
§ 729 (72 hours or the next day court is in session whichever is sooner); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 419.577 (1953) (24 hours); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-2,5 (1956) (24
hours); ToENN. CODE ANN. § 37-251 (Supp. 1964) (48 hours); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.04.053 (Supp. 1964) (72 hours); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-104 (1957) (72
hours).
35. The typical provisions relating to the assumption of custody of a juvenile
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do so on the basis of the needs of the juvenile. The typical provision
recites that the child should be released unless the circumstances are
such that his welfare requires that immediate custody be assumed.36
pending the disposition of his case are, of necessity, quite complex. Yet, the overall
plan is directed toward an early release of the juvenile to his parents or an immediate
determination of whether he requires temporary detention by the juvenile court. Gen-
erally, the juvenile may be taken into custody in two ways: by arrest (a term which
must be used advisedly since most juvenile court acts expressly provide that the
process shall not be deemed an arrest) or by summons. In the latter case, there is
no problem since the child is being summoned by the court and will be brought
there before any further steps are taken. The problems arise in the case of an
arrest. In the latter case, most states have elaborate provisions to ensure that the
child will either be released immediately upon written promise of his parent to
bring him before the juvenile court at the time set for his hearing or if not so
released, brought immediately before the juvenile court for a determination of
whether he requires temporary detention. See, e.g., CONN. GENa. STAT. REv. § 17-65
(1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03 (1961); IHwArt REV. LAws § 333-14 (1955);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2021 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.110
(1962); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.14) (1962); NEB. REv. STAT. §
43-205.02 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. JuDIrLRay-FmLY COURT ACT § 724; Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 248 (Supp.
1964); S.D. CODE § 43.0318 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-22 (1963).
However, some states alter the procedure by permitting the arresting officer to
detain the juvenile so long as notice is sent immediately to the juvenile court giving
the reasons for not releasing. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.140 (1962); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-3212 (1956); MriN. STAT. § 260.171 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
169.6 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-32 (1952); OlcLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 811
(1962); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04-.053 (Supp. 1964). In some states the
burden of making the determination has been taken out of the hands of the juvenile
court entirely and placed in the hands of the probation officer. See, e.g., Aarz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (1956); CAL. WELFArE & INsT'Ns CODE § 627; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-2417 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-42 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
197 (1960). In others, the responsibility for making the determination appears to rest
on the arresting officer-subject to certain time limits. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
16-1811 (Supp. 1963) (detention for not more than 24 hours before court appearance);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.141 (1959) (24 hours); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.577 (1953).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.030 (1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 93-209 (1956);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1575 (1951); MnN. STAT. § 260.135 (Supp. 1964); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 211.101 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169.14 (1964); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-8-34 (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-27 (1960); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.28 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 802 (1962); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 8 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-15 (1963); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-105 (1957). On the other hand, several other states seem to shift
the emphasis a bit by authorizing detention when it is deemed necessary for the
welfare of the child or the community. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.140 (1957);
OnE. REv. STAT. § 419.486 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 606 (1959). Another
alternative ground for assumption of custody pending the disposition of the case is
reasonable ground for believing the juvenile would not appear at his hearing or would
flee from the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-06 (1952);
MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 10-608 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-205.03 (Supp.
1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.140 (1957); N.Y. JuDicImAy-FAmILy CoURT ACT § 739
(McKinney 1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1182 (1962). At least two states provide
that custody may be assumed for any good reason. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 152-A,
§ 14 (Supp. 1963) (in discretion of the court); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-166 (1960)
("other good reason"). One state has attempted to spell out with particularity those
instances in which custody may be assumed; Michigan limits detention pending the
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Contemplated by these provisions is an informed determination by the
juvenile court judge based upon such considerations as the juvenile's
mental and physical condition, his background and environment at
home-the intended emphasis being on the condition of the child and
the circumstances he will face if released. 7
V. TiE PROBLEM ON THE PRAcricAL LEVEL-
THE UNDERLYING AssuMPTIONS REVISITED
Admitting the paper perfection of the various code provisions
relating to detention procedures and facilities does not resolve the
issue. The more important question is their practical operation; the
application of the theory has uncovered many problems. Although
the juvenile court acts contemplate a determination by the juvenile
hearings to those juveniles (1) whose home conditions are such that detention is
immediately necessary, (2) who are likely to run away, (3) whose offenses are so
serious that their release is likely to endanger the public, or (4) who are in need
of observation, study or treatment by qualified experts. Mici. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(598.15) (1962).
37. This can be seen more clearly by examining the comments to the standard act
and the recommendations of its authors. The comments to the Standard Juvenile
Court Act would limit detention to three classes of juveniles: (1) those %vho are almost
certain to run away before the disposition of their case, (2) those who are almost
certain to commit an offense dangerous to themselves or the community, and (3)
those who must be held for transfer to another jurisdiction. STANDARD JUVENILE
COURT ACT § 17. However, these criteria presuppose two different types of custodial
care: (1) detention, which is defined as temporary care in physically restrictive
facilities, and (2) shelter, which is defined as temporary care in physically unrestricted
facilities. As will be seen below, most states do not have adequate facilities of even
the first type, and facilities of the second type are virtually nonexistent. FiuF=m &
WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 108-09. This is not to say that the criteria suggested
are not good, but merely to indicate that perhaps detention should be provided in
many of the circumstances in which the Standard Juvenile Court Act would provide
shelter or some other unrestricted custody. Such circumstances are: (1) physical
danger or strained relationship between the juvenile and his parents, (2) other need
of protection, or (3) need of clinical or psychological study and treatment. The
Advisory Council of Judges of the N.P.P.A. would limit detention to juveniles: (1)
who are likely to run away, (2) whose problems are so serious or family relationship
so strained that release would cause further trouble, (3) who are in need of pro-
tection, (4) who have a history of serious offenses which indicate that their release
would be a serious threat to the community, (5) who are parole violators, or (6) who
are in need of psychological study or care. N.P.P.A., GUiDEs FOR JUVENILE COURT
JUDGEs 46-47 (1957). The National Council on Crime and Delinquency adopts
the same criteria as the Standard Juvenile Court Act, adding admonitions against the
use of detention as a substitute for specialized care or treatment. N.C.C.D.,
STANDARDs AND GUms FOR TinE DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 15-17 (2d ed.
1961). It is apparent from the foregoing that the emphasis is on the needs of the juvenile.
Those differences of opinion which do exist are merely over the form which the
custody is to take. This is not to say, however, that the interests of the community
are to be forgotten entirely. As the above authorities indicate, there are situations
in which the interests of the community will require that the court assume temporary
custody. Yet, this will occur only in the exceptional case.
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court judge based upon a consideration of the conditions facing the
child at home, the likelihood of his appearance, at the hearing, and
his individual needs for treatment and supervision,38 in many instances
no such considered determination is or can be made. Among the
factors responsible are crowded juvenile court dockets, inadequately
staffed receiving centers, and poorly trained juvenile court personnel.3 9
Moreover, the problem does not end with the initial determination.
Assuming that an informed determination could be made, what choices
are available to the juvenile court judge with respect to the order he
can give? The truth of the matter is that he has little, if any, choice
in most juvenile court jurisdictions. While some localities have had
remarkable success in establishing specialized detention facilities,
40
the natonal picture is very discouraging. In 1960 the National Council
of Crime and Delinquency published a report on detention practices
in the United States.41 This report indicated that most states have
fewer than six detention homes and many have none at all.42 Further-
more, the alternative procedures,43 which were to relieve the problems
posed by a shortage of specialized centers, have seen only limited
development.44 Even the protective provisions of the acts prohibiting
jail detention45 have broken down, for most of these prohibitory
sections are qualified with exceptions provided for those cases in
38. See note 37 supra.
39. We have already seen the criteria for determining whether a juvenile should
or should not be detained are generally agreed upon. See note 37 supra. However,
without an evaluation of each juvenile in terms of these criteria, the mere fact that
they are agreed upon is of little significance. It is not hard to believe that in most
of the large metropolitan areas crowded court schedules make it impossible for the
judge to make such an evaluation. See, e.g., Statement of the Honorable Samuel S.
Liebowitz, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-40 (1959). Yet, a
recent California study indicates that even in smaller counties almost 50% of the
juvenile cases are disposed of in less than 10 minutes. 2 REPORT OF THE GOVERNOn'S
SPECIAL CoIrxf. ON JUVENILE: JUsTIcE 16 (1960). The Statement of the Honorable
Irving Ben Cooper, supra at 6, is indicative of the exasperation which is felt by many
judges faced with this difficult task and armed with too little time and information
to execute it: "No judge is God. We are human beings clothed with certain authority,
and we look at this fellow, who looks contrite. He may be a mental derelict. He
may be in need of treatment. We look at another youth and he is angry and he is
snarling and he is defiant; and all he may need is an arm around his shoulder."
40. See, e.g., N.C.C.D., DErENTION PnXc-ncE passim (1960).
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 166.
43. See note 31 supra.
44. Foster homes, for example, have seen significant use only in Georgia and
Buffalo, New York. WALD & FBEED, op. cit. supra note 3, at 108 n.52. Probably the
major reasons for the failure of the juvenile court to use foster homes in most areas
are lack of funds to adequately subsidize these homes and the natural reluctance of
persons, agencies or institutions to assume the responsibility for a "juvenile delinquent."
45. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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which there are no other facilities available.46 Finally, the judge faced
with the limited choice between jail detention and release is often
forced to determine arbitrarily which juveniles will be released and
which will be detained.4 7 The result is that the juvenile court proce-
dure has often failed before it has even begun.48
VI. ALTEPNATIvE SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of this discouraging picture of the juvenile court detention
procedures in action, the position of those who still argue for an
absolute right to bail is not hard to understand. Clearly, the justifica-
tions for assumption of custody which are argued on the theoretical
level have no basis in fact. Furthermore, such an assumption of
custody involves the derogation of not only the right of the juvenile to
live at home but also the right of the parent to provide for his care,
custody and control. "It is no accomplishment for the courts to inter-
fere in the lives of people and then because of lack of staff and
facilities proceed to substitute court neglect for the neglect of parents
and communities."49
While the proponents of an absolute right to bail may rightly
derive support from the problems facing the juvenile courts, their
solution is not the only one available. Nor is it the most desirable.
In the first place, there is no assurance that establishing a right to
bail would solve more problems than it would create. One need only
46. Even those provisions for separating the juvenile from adults if jail detention
is required are given only token respect. Such separate facilities often turn out
to be "a bunk on top of a block of cells within hearing if not sight of adult criminals
or woefully inadequate rooms in a police station." WALD & FREEM, op. cit. supra note
3, at 105. The result is that every year over 75,000 juveniles are confined in jails
most of which are unfit for adult offenders. N.C.C.D., DETENTI N PnAcrTcE 166
(1960).
47. Statement of the Honorable Nathaniel Kaplan, supra note 39, at 66.
48. It has failed in two respects: First, it has failed by unnecessarily detaining
juveniles not in need of detention. It is not uncommon for 50% of the juveniles
who are referred to juvenile court to be detained. WALD & FsuExD, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 97. Yet, this is five times that which the N.C.C.D. considers necessary.
STANDARDs ANm GumES FOR =E DETENON OF CMLDREN AND YOUTH 16 (2d ed.
1961). "In view of the disgraceful condition of detention facilities in most areas,
such unnecessary detention is more than a failure; it opens a Pandora's box of
plaguing problems. Second, the juvenile court procedure has failed by releasing
juveniles who are in need of detention, care or treatment. These are the individuals
for whom the juvenile court was established. Yet, until they are identified, their needs
must go unsatisfied. For example, it has been estimated that from twenty to twenty-
five per cent of the juveniles brought before juvenile courts are in need of psychiatric
care; yet in most instances these juveniles are either released or placed in a jail to
await their hearing." Statement of W. C. Turnbladh, Director of the N.P.P.A., supra
note 39, at 81.
49. Statement of the Honorable Irving Ben Cooper, supra note 39, at 9, quoting
Mayor Wagner of New York City.
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look at the operation of the bail system in adult criminal proceedings
to find serious cause to doubt its potential as a solution to the problems
facing the juvenile court. Our jails are still over-crowded by those
too poor to exercise their right to bail; appearance at trial by those
inclined to flee has not been assured by the monetary inducement
provided by bail; and even the guardian angel of the bail system, the
bondsman, has become the subject of frequent critical comment.50
Furthermore, the establishment of a right to bail would be an unneces-
sary compromise with the philosophy of the juvenile court acts5'
when there are other alternatives available. Of course, the obvious
alternative is the establishment of adequate detention facilities. Yet,
this suggestion is almost naive, for it assumes a solution to the basic
problem facing the juvenile court system today-lack of funds.52
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that if the present facilities
were used more wisely, their expansion in many areas might be
unnecessary.
53
The detention problem can be met most effectively at its source with
a screening procedure which would provide the juvenile court with
more meaningful control over the number and type of juveniles
50. For a discussion of the bail system and its critics see WALD & FREED, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 9-21.
51. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text. Those who suggest establishment
of a right to bail would do well to consider whether the benefits to be derived from such
a move would be worth the cost, i.e., an exchange of the basic policy of the juvenile
court acts, which is to provide detention only for those in need of detention, for a
policy which would provide detention only for those in need of money.
52. Lack of funds cannot be traced to any one major cause. One might say in the
first instance that the majority of the voting public are not interested in the problems
facing the juvenile court. However, the truth of the matter is that most people are
just not aware that those problems exist. If the latter is true, suppose the politician
were able to muster enough interest to support a drive for appropriations. For all
his work he would find his hands tied by the present provisions of most juvenile
court acts which place the burden of financing the juvenile court program on the
counties. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 387(171) (Supp. 1963); CAL. WELFEAm &
INsTeNS CODE § 850; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 416.01 (1960); IowA CODE § 232.36 (Supp.
1964); Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 208.130 (1962); MumN. STAT. § 260.101 (Supp. 1964);
N.Y. CoUNTY LAw § 218-a; S.D. CODE § 43.0309 (1939); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.31
(1957). Yet, it has been estimated that in the United States there are 2,500
counties the resources of which are too small to adequately carry the burden of
financing a juvenile court program. N.P.P.A., supra note 37, at 43-44. Some states have
attempted to solve this problem by providing for regional facilities maintained by
groups of contingent counties. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 416.05 (1960); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, § 2168 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.612 (1963).
However, this solution has been citicized for being politically naive, N.P.P.A., supra,
at 44, and so far experience has proven that such regional detention facilities cannot
be relied on to solve the financing problems. N.C.C.D., supra note 40, at 167-69.
Some of these problems could be met by the states if they were to assume responsi-
bility for detention. See N.C.C.D., STAmIARus, supra note 37, at 149-50. But as
yet, only a few states have undertaken this task. Ibid. Furthermore, even state
sponsorship involves some potentially difficult problems. See ibid. for discussion.
53. N.C.C.D., STANDARms, supra note 37, at 13.
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admitted to the detention facilities. By gathering data relating to the
juvenile's mental and physical condition, his background and environ-
ment at home and presenting this information to the judge, the
informed determination contemplated by the juvenile court acts could
be made a reality. An improvement at this stage of the juvenile court
proceedings could bring about several desirable results. First, it
would relieve some of the congestion in the presently available
detention facilities. 54 In addition, it would tend to minimize the
unnecessary intrusions upon the family life of the juvenile.55 Finally,
it would provide greater assurance that those in need of detention or
treatment would receive it.56 The problem here is not lack of criteria
for such admission control;57 rather, the problem is finding someone
to apply the criteria. The judge alone is unable to perform this
function, since he does not have the time to assemble the necessary
information.5 Alternative solutions at this point have ranged from
the creation of an entirely separate juvenile court to relieve the
pressure on the existing court system to provisions for more judges
or facilities to assist them. Of course, all of these suggestions meet
with the familiar problem of obtaining the funds necessary for their
implementation. The suggestion that an entirely separate juvenile
court be established seems more than likely to suffer defeat at the
appropriation stage. To a large extent, the same problem confronts
those who suggest that more judges be provided. Not only do the
salary demands of highly trained personnel present a problem, but
in the first instance there is a shortage of persons with adequate
training.
The most workable and politically feasible solution lies in the
proposal to provide screening centers to assist the present juvenile
court judges in making their determinations. Facilities for such
centers might vary in size from a suite of two rooms to an entire
building depending upon the demands of the particular jurisdiction.
However, they should encompass comfortable waiting and private
consultation areas apart and distinct from detention, jail or prison
facilities. Personnel needs will vary, but at the minimum would
54. Under the new Family Court Act in New York City the admission control
service was a substantial factor in reducing the daily detention census almost 40%
in the first eight months of its operation. WALD & FREED, BAiL N THE UNITED STATES:
1964 100 (1964). In view of the usually high rate of detention, see note 48 supra,
and the estimated rate which should be the case if detention criteria were correctly
applied, ibid., it would seem that most areas would benefit as has New York City
from the establishment of an admission control service.
55. See note 48 supra.
56. Ibid.
57. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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call for someone to supervise those juveniles waiting to be screened
and another to do the screening. The screening procedure is primarily
one of gathering information. The use of forms designed by judges,
psychologists and sociologists to provide information necessary for an
intelligent disposition of the juvenile case will facilitate this procedure
and eliminate the need for highly trained personnel at this level.5
9
The necessary information 0 may be obtained by a combination of
interviews, telephone contacts and other investigatory techniques in
much the same manner as the investigation involving the release
of adults on recognizance is handled.61 After this investigation is com-
pleted, the findings would be summarized on the prepared forms and
sent with the juvenile to the juvenile court judge. Armed with the
findings of such a center, the present juvenile court judges could
make more effective determinations and probably in less time than is
presently required.
Certainly, such a center would cost money, but it appears to offer
one of the most economical solutions. Furthermore, there is evidence
that such a proposal could work. In the closely related area of release
of adults on recognizance, several experiments have shown the prac-
ticability and efficacy of such information gathering procedures.
62
When the problem being faced has as little political appeal as that
under discussion here, a proposal with the lowest cost and the highest
promise of success is the proposal most likely to meet with legislative
approval.
59. To some extent the use of highly trained personnel at this level would waste
talent, since before their training can be brought to bear effectively on any given
case, a certain minimum amount of information must be assembled. Assembling this
information does not require training, but it does require time-time which judges,
psychologists and social workers cannot afford to spend. The fundamental principle
of screening centers is that this time-consuming function can effectively be delegated
to less highly trained personnel, leaving the judges, psychologists and social workers
free to make their decisions on the basis of the information gathered by the screening
centers.
60. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
61. See WALD & FaEED, Op. cit. supra note 54.
62. We are interested in these experiments merely as they show that such infor-
mation gathering services can operate economically to provide the judge with the
information he needs to make an intelligent determination of whether or not to detain.
Those experiments have shown both economy of operation and ease of integration
into pre-existing judicial procedures. See WALD & FREED, op. cit. supra note 54, at
57-70; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67 (1963).
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